Causal Link: How the FSV Destroyed Entrepreneurs

Executive Summary

The Fraud Signalerings Voorziening (FSV) was an internal Belastingdienst system operational from 2007 to February 2020 that registered approximately 180,000 citizens as fraud suspects without verification, due process, or notification. This report identifies three causal chains that connect the FSV to the systematic destruction of entrepreneurs — particularly MKB businesses, ZZP’ers, and childcare agency owners. Chain 1: FSV registration leads to “fraud” label, triggering increased surveillance, tax assessments, OGS qualification, asset seizure, and bankruptcy. Chain 2: FSV labels childcare agencies as “facilitators,” leading to collective punishment of all connected parents. Chain 3: Discriminatory profiling via nationality data creates structural disadvantage for entrepreneurs with migration backgrounds. The State’s systematic destruction of evidence — FSV registrations, 9,000 appeal files, and 64 million data vault files — justifies reversing the burden of proof.

What Happened

The FSV functioned as both an original selection mechanism and an active damage amplifier. Once registered, an entrepreneur’s FSV label followed them through every future interaction with the Belastingdienst. All directorates (MKB, Toeslagen, Particulieren, GO) had access. FSV data fed into Deloitte’s risk classification models as source data, and unfiltered exports were used for statistical profiling and shared with the FIOD.

Entrepreneurs entered the FSV through three routes: via their own fiscal behavior (deviant income patterns flagged by Project 1043), via childcare agency/facilitator constructions (CAF 80/20 approach assuming guilt), or via discriminatory profiling (nationality as input criterion, “allochtoon” as first selection criterion for MKB startup investigations).

The Belastingdienst reversed the causal relationship: instead of the State proving fraud, the entrepreneur had to prove innocence. The “stoppertje” procedure — 160 messages with this codeword triggering immediate benefit cessation without substantive review — exemplified this reversal.

Evidence

Chain 1 is documented through the tax chain (R07): FSV registration → intensified surveillance (4 follow-up investigations/year for “allochtoon” startups) → tax assessments → OGS qualification (automatic at debts exceeding €10,000) → full recovery (“all-or-nothing”) → asset seizure → WSNP exclusion → bankruptcy. Each step is condicio sine qua non, reasonably foreseeable, and reproducible across hundreds of entrepreneurs.

Chain 2 is evidenced by the CAF’s 80/20 approach: of approximately 630 childcare agencies investigated, ~2,200 families were affected through collective punishment. The PwC document reveals conscious escalation: “[Facilitator] is not pleased with the tone of the letters. That was also the intention.”

Chain 3 is technically proven: BVR Nationaliteit was embedded in the SAS model data pipeline by Deloitte, 11,236 tax returns were flagged based on second nationality (2012-2014), and 71% of victims had a migration background (CBS). The model ran with insufficient training data — “100% correct and 100% incorrect” — which was known at launch.

Evidence destruction is documented across five categories: FSV registrations deleted, ~9,000 appeal files prematurely destroyed, 64 million data vault files unsorted, 36.7 million Q-drive files inaccessible, and 100 uncontrolled locally developed applications.

Analysis

The three causal chains each independently satisfy BW 6:95 et seq. and BW 6:98 causation requirements. The burden of proof should be reversed on three independent grounds: (1) unlawful evidence destruction by the State (following HR NJ 1994/583 Vejlby/Rijnhaven), (2) structural opacity — the FSV, “stoppertje” procedure, and selective document provision created an information asymmetry favoring the State, and (3) the mechanism was foreseeable, reproducible, and predictable.

Upon reversal, the State must prove that FSV registration was lawful, played no role in tax assessments, OGS labels were justified, and the data vault contains no relevant information. Given the destroyed evidence, this is in most cases impossible.

Compensation remains grossly inadequate: material damage covered at 25%, immaterial damage at 5-10%, business loss/goodwill at 0-4%, and statutory interest at 0%. The Rechtbank Noord-Holland case (ECLI:NL:RBNHO:2025:8961) illustrates the gap: €654,159 claimed, €30,000 awarded — 4.6% coverage.

Sources

• R07 — MKB-Impact Toeslagenaffaire
• R08 — PwC Working Document FSV Effects
• R09 — Deloitte Risk Classification 2013
• R06 — FSV Stuurgroep 25 juni 2020
• ECLI:NL:RBNHO:2025:8961 — Rechtbank Noord-Holland 19-06-2025
• HR NJ 1994/583 (Vejlby/Rijnhaven); HR NJ 1996/688 (Kleyensteijn/Swinkels)
• AP Report July 2020
• Commissie-Donner March 2020; Parliamentary Inquiry December 2020
• Inspectie OE 22-04-2026
• CBS Statistics victims toeslagenaffaire